

ABSTRACTS

MATERIALS OF RUSSIAN CONFERENCE «THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY», TOMSK, 20-21 MAY 2011

P. 5. *Ankin D.V.* ABSENT METAPHOR. The paper is concerned with the relativity of the metaphor, it has no any purely linguistic substance. It is argued that there is a metaphor only in the intersection of semantics and pragmatics, and it is vanished when we switch to semantics only. The thesis is defended in the way of comparison with the figure of irony, which has a similar "twilight" existence and disappears immediately without adequate pragmatics. Some key ideas of Donald Davidson are used as a basis for my own interpretation of the metaphor.

Key words: metaphor, irony, pragmatics, literal meaning, Davidson.

P. 13. *Vinnik D.V.* DETECTION OF ACTUAL MENTAL CONTENT. Theoretical boundaries and empirical limits The paper discusses theoretical boundaries of technical methods to detect actual mental content from standpoints of contemporary physicalist and functionalist conceptions. The absolute sustainable decoding of intentional states content is possible on the basement of complete functionalism type of psychophysical theory. However contemporary analogue methods of detection have large potential to determine mental content in the case of equipment adjustment.

Key words: philosophy of mind, intentionality, mind control, electrocortycography, physicalizm, externalism, intentionality, functionalism, reflection, introspection.

P. 18. *Ladov V.A.* DOES THE WORD "SENSATION" REFER TO SENSATION? (discussing L. Wittgenstein's the private language argument). The private language argument presented in L. Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" is discussed in the article. The argument was immediately connected with the rule-following problem in the discussions of the end of the twentieth century. the author asserts that this interpretation of the argument is not only one possible. On the foundation of P. Hacker's later writings the author offers a new interpretation of the private language argument.

Key words: private language, sensation, meaning, rule-following, communication.

P. 31. *Lamberov L.D.* DEFLATIONISM, CONTEXTUALITY AND THEORY OF MEANING. An analysis of the conceptual foundations of deflationary theories of truth is given, the relationship between deflationism and the truth-conditional theories of meaning is considered. It is proposed to use a pragmatic (pragmatic-semantic) principle to overcome the difficulties of deflationism. The same principle allows to formulate a dispositional version of the deflationary theory of meaning.

Key words: deflationism, theory of meaning, contextuality, interchangeability.

P. 38. *Nesterov A.Y.* INTERPRETATION STRATEGIES AND THE PROBLEM OF INSUFFICIENT DETERMINACY OF MEANING. Object of investigation: the procedure of interpretation. Subject of investigation: strategies and limits of interpretation. Aim: to explain interpretation strategies arising in defining the notion of interpretation through the antithesis interpretation / understanding and to show limitations of strategies of content interpretation while using technical semiotic models, in the light of the problem of indeterminacy of meaning. Main results: Interpretation consists in choice and use of a semantic rule. We use four-component semantic model and use the term meaning for the signified object, the term sense for syntactic place of sign (e.g. language) system, by which the meaning is given (signified), the term sign – the carrier of designation and signification functions expressed in some substratum, and the term interpretant for the condition when the sign is able to fulfill the functions of designation and signification. Thus, for the subject of semiosis the procedure of interpretation means dealing with meaning, while understanding means dealing with sense (understanding proper consists in reversing an expression, i.e. listener understands something where speaker expresses something), and dealing with interpretant means procedure of using a sign. The most essential difference concerning technical strategies is the difference in what is the substrate of sign, i.e. what exactly can be interpreted, language signs only or nonverbal facts as well. The first case is that of "strong interpretation", the second – that of "weak interpretation". The most essential difference concerning conceptual strategies is the difference in appropriate contexts defining pragmatic background of meaning. Two most important types of contexts are traditions of "understanding the author better than he could do it himself" by F.D.E. Schleiermacher and

“understanding in another way” by H.-G.Gadamer. The presence of indeterminacy is the condition of the possibility of interpretation, and its eliminating is the result the interpretation is aimed at. Indeterminacy of communicative signs means strong interpretation, and indeterminacy ofgnoseological signs means weak interpretation. Conclusions: Principle of weak interpretation makes necessary a new interpretation conceptual strategy which would avoid both dogmatism and solipsism, and so-called “ontological underdeterminacy” can be seen as its limit and its condition.

Key words: understanding, interpretation, semiotics, sign, meaning.

P. 46. *Ogleznev V.V.* CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AS A METHODOLOGICAL TOOL OF ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE. The paper presents a study of the place and importance of conceptual analysis in the methodological arsenal of analytical jurisprudence. The article shows the necessity of conceptual analysis in law, taking into account the specifics of this area of the humanities. Quine’s view that there is no non-circular way to explicate the notion of analyticity, together with his observation that any claim can be revised in the face of recalcitrant experience, is believed by some to have conclusively refuted traditional views about conceptual analysis and metaphysics. Quine’s analysis shows, according to these philosophers, that philosophy lacks a distinctive methodology and that philosophical theorizing should be continuous with scientific theorizing. The debate about methodology began in epistemology, but is now prominent in other areas of philosophy including legal philosophy; and there are a number of legal philosophers who accept Quine’s view that philosophy should abandon conceptual analysis for a scientific methodology. Brian Leiter, the most influential proponent of naturalism in legal philosophy, has complained that legal philosophy is one of the few areas in philosophy that has ignored the damning Quinean criticisms of traditional conceptual analysis. While it is undeniably true that naturalistic philosophy thrives in many areas, traditional conceptual analysis seems to be thriving in all areas of philosophy including, as Leiter suggests, philosophy of law not much has really changed. Theorists in all areas of philosophy continue to do conceptual analysis. Metaphysics continues to thrive, as does conceptual analysis in epistemology, meta-ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of law. The concepts of law, free will, mind, knowledge, and goodness are explored in hundreds of published papers every year – and the rigorous methodology presupposed in these papers seems distinct from scientific methodology with its foundational reliance on induction and empirical observation.

Key words: conceptual analysis, analytical jurisprudence, epistemology, W.V.O. Quine.

P. 52. *Samoilov I.V.* PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATIONS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH ONTOLOGY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS. An adequate physical theory requires something more than just mathematical equations and rules. It needs a philosophical conceptual framework as well. Something special that allows theoretical statements to be connected with human experiences. In classical mechanics the interpretive framework that ties the mathematics to experience does not affect our ontological notion. The basic idea of the classically conceived connection between the physically and psychologically describes aspects of nature is carry-over from the planetary dynamics that was the origin of classical mechanics: the locations of objects are regarded as being directly knowable, without any effects on those objects. In quantum mechanics the process of acquiring information, or knowledge pertaining to the location of that object affects the state that is being probed. This fact changes a status of observer. Now observer is an active part of the acquiring information scheme. New idea of observer requires new model. Observer consists of several parts: object+ apparatus+ environment+ consciousness of researcher. One of the most important function of consciousness is selection of conceptual interpretive framework for mathematical structure that ties theory and experiment. The results of experiments make sense only in appointed interpretative paradigm.

Key words: interpretative paradigm, observer, ontology of quantum mechanics, quantum observations.

P. 57. *Surovtsev V.A.* NECESSARY A POSTERIORI, COUNTERFACTUAL FANCIES AND FORMS OF ESSENTIALISM. The argumentation of S. Kripke in favor of the concept of necessary a posteriori is considered. Kripke’s reconstruction of the way of argumentation of essentialists undertakes as an example. It is shown that the a posteriori proof of statements such as $\Box P$ essentially depends on the form of essentialism, accepted for justification of the premise such as $P \supset \Box P$.

Key words: necessary a posteriori, transworld identity, counterfactual fancies, forms of essentialism.

P. 64. *Tarasov I.P., Kazennov D.K.* NONCOGNITIVISM AND PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. In modern metaethics terms noncognitivism and emotivism indicate the position in accordance with which the moral statements are deprived of empirical content (they do not describe any facts), and express the emotional reactions of people about certain situations. The spectrum of

these reactions can be quite diverse: «condemnation», «fear», «fault», «approval», however, these differences doesn't matter for noncognitivist analysis of the moral statements. It is considered that emotivism denies the cognitive component language of morality, because the emotions contrary to the facts don't form belief. In connection with this become two logical conclusions: moral statements don't express belief» and «moral statements do not possess the truth». These two conclusions never were accepted up to the end in philosophical community and served as a source of paradoxes for the emotivism. Especially it concerns the first conclusion. This conclusion became the basis for a Frege-Geach problem and other difficulties associated with the similarity in the semantic structure of the descriptive and moral statements. These difficulties can be avoided if we consider the noncognitivism not only as a semantic doctrine that analyzes the nature of the meaning of moral statements, but in a broader historical and philosophical point of view, as a legal successor of utilitarianism and ethical subjectivism. Rejecting the cognitive component of the moral statements, noncognitivism specifies not in absence in them empirical content and cognitive capacity, and on their epistemic value. This thesis must be understood as a statement about the pragmatics of moral language. The absence of cognitive component is the impossibility of use of the classical mechanism of the justification for moral statements (in the first place, the true/false), not the lack of empirical content. It is a question of subjective interest which lies in the basis of moral statements, and subjective interest is quite empirical and cognitive, though and not objective.

Key words: noncognitivism, emotivism, meaning, semantics, pragmatics.

P. 74. *Filippovski V. A.* RELATIONS BETWEEN LANGUAGE, THINKING AND ONTOLOGY AND TYPOLOGIES OF LANGUAGE COMPONENTS FROM SYNTACTIC, SEMANTIC, METHODOLOGICAL AND COMMUNICATIVE VIEWPOINTS (BASED ON FORMALIZED LANGUAGES). Linguistic systems both natural and artificial carry out many functions among which cognitive function there is. As for cognitive function any linguistic system it is possible to consider from syntactic, semantic, and methodological viewpoints. The question about relations between language, thinking and ontology may be divided in following four subquestions: 1) what kinds of objects a language forces us to see?; 2) what kinds of objects a language forces us to accept?; 3) what ontological assumptions a language forces us to make?; and 4) how correlate objects of given language and assumptions about them with reality? The criterion "to see' means to know how to denote by signs" acts as the answer on first question. The Carnap-Quine's criterion acts as the answer on second question. This criterion suits for languages of Frege-Russell type. It formulates by Quine as "to be is to be a value of a bound variable".

The Church's criterion "language obliges to make such ontological commitments which formulated in analytic true sentences of this language" acts as the answer on third question. From our viewpoint fourth question correlates with external questions (according to Carnap's conception of linguistic frameworks). We consider that external questions have cognitive status, and they get a solution by means of methodological viewpoint. For it is needed acknowledge conventionalism principle or realism principle. Language components may be divided into classes in every aspect: syntactic, semantic, methodological and communicative. For every such typology there are some tools that lead to it. Typology of language expressions (as strings of basic symbols) belongs purview of syntax and represents by itself formal distinction of language expressions on basis of syntactic criterions. This typology has being carried out by means of rules for constructing complex language expressions from atomic. Typology of language components on semantic level has being carried out by means of system of semantic categories.

Definition types of entities that have being correlated to semantic categories, goes on methodological level, and it represents by itself denotation the nature of entities to which belongs this or that type of meaning of language expressions.

Relations between these aspects of languages are regulated by rules. Rules of interpretation define assignment of meanings according to language expressions. Defined language expressions are interpreted by these rules. In present paper the rules that define types of entities being correlated to semantic categories, and that define of nature of entities to be called rules of sigmatic interpretation.

Key words: language, thinking, ontology, language aspects, language functions.

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANITY

P. 81. *Goncharov V. V.* ON THE ISSUE OF THE WAYS OF CONCEPTS' DEVELOPMENT. The article considers the ways of concepts' development and the development of the meaning of the utterances. On the examples of the judicial practice the author alleges that there may be a simultaneous

change in intension and extension or a change in extension only. Certain consequences are made on the regularities of the application of these operations.

Key words: meaning, intension, extension, transformation of concepts.

P. 86. *Inishev I.N.* THE INTERPLAY OF THE MATERIAL AND THE SEMANTIC WITHIN ICONIC EXPERIENCE. In the course of the last two decades, "discourse on images" has become an important part of contemporary philosophical (and not only philosophical) investigations. This tendency arises on the one hand from the imaginization of current social life and on the other hand from the recognition of substantial role that images play in production and translation of knowledge. Frequently the emotional reaction to problematics of images indicates that the question of iconic meaning is never exclusively of theoretical nature. Not least this circumstance explains why there are nowadays so much different understandings of images: from treatment of images in terms of symbol theory to theoretical positions approaching the images as agents of social action. In this article we consider problematics of images/iconicity in perspective of meaning theory. The specificity of iconic meanings consists in unavoidable tension between meaningful and material aspects of iconic experience. This tension indicates an essential shift in the problematic of images: from vertical dimension of reference (relation between iconic representation and things/circumstances iconically represented) to horizontal dimension of iconic plane itself (relations between iconic elements). As the model for our analysis of semantic specificity of iconic objects we take two-dimensional material images (paintings, photographs, pictures on screen). First of all this model has an advantage of externality. It blocks the subjectivist way of interpretation of images. What follows from it is that the question whether we have in current case to do with image or not can be answered only on the way of structural thinking. Neither topological considerations (mental sphere as specifically iconic reign) nor normative (whether an object can be classified as artwork or not) ones should come into question. Only the inner (i.e. structural) traits of an object should be counted by any endeavor to define it as the icon. Among inner traits of the icons we find such as "iconical plane", which differs from what we call "physical surface". In distinction from physical surface iconical plane knows no external limits. In this regard it is absolute. But its absoluteness is quite compatible with its phenomenality. Iconical plane becomes visible under condition of simultaneity. All iconic elements of an external image should be conceived simultaneous to become visible as iconical plane, i.e. as an image in the strict sense. In the result physical (pre-semantic) materiality transforms into iconical (semantic) materiality, which remaining phenomenal (visible) establishes new mode of spatial relationship (the metrical relations transform into grammatical ones).

Key words: iconic turn, iconic plane, mediam, semantic materiality.

P. 94. *Kolodiy N.A.* CULTURE AS A RESOURCE OF AN EXPERIENCE ECONOMY. The first decade of the XXI century was marked by experience economy (sensations, emotions), which displayed itself as fully as possible in the sociocultural sphere of a post-labour society. There were a lot of scientific publications that have been written recently about the cardinal changes in modern society and its economy. They are full of terms such as «attention economy», «dream society», «market of emotions», «the age of access», «the support economy», «the experience economy». According to the ideas developed in those scientific research papers, the competition that exists for a long time as a competition of products and companies turned into its new phase - competition in innovations. Innovations brought to such a phenomenon as co-creation with customers and the economy experiences, which became a basis for value and a foundation for innovations. In accordance with the position of C.K. Prahalad, V. Ramaswamy features of new products created with customers and expanding of experience economy, its extend to different spheres are already visible. The question, which, however, till to this day has not been resolved is the question of whether or not in this economy experiences a central place is occupied by culture, which is mean as a source, a reservoir of new meanings, stereotypes and myths and, of course, impressions? It has long been observed that in developed European countries for a quite a long time is realized the evolutionary transition to a new type of socio-economic development – post-informational, post-industrial society. Culture in this type of society, not only changes the scope of employment, but also changes the type of communications. It is exactly structure information exchange, knowledge and services. Culture saturates the space of life and work with meanings and symbols. If that space has no deep foundations, roots, culture creates its laboratory, feigning cultural traditions. But what means feigning in tourism, feigning which is connected with leisure? Does not the concept of feigning contradict with the idea of authenticity, which has always been committed to the organizers of leisure-time activities, tourism? No, it does not. In the context of contemporary trends culture started to regard as the most powerful resource of desire economy, as a strong and almost real actor, which initiate new life practices, new patterns of behavior,

including consumer behavior. Experts in culture learning and "mapping" available resources of culture, develop appropriate management techniques and develop specific projects related with the potential using of meanings, images, symbols and cultural heritage in general. Projects are based on the strong assumption that culture accumulates all the positive effects in that case, if there is real coordination among all actors involved in the formation of a new image area, community, and urban environment.

Key words: culture of a post-labour society, experience economy, competition in innovations, co-creation with customers, feigning, liminality, civilization of leisure, modularization, simulacrum.

P. 103. *Musokhranova M.B.* LANGUAGE OF MEDICINE: FROM SIGN TO CHRONICLE. The aim of the present article is to understand the essence of the Language of Medicine, the basis of which is a sign that reports to a human being about existence of death, pain, illness. Taking into account the opposition between the language of medicine and the general language, the language of medicine is the result (enclosed in terms) of interpretation and consolidation of the pathological facts destroying human life and so it appears possible to compare the language of medicine with the special document where the human being is represented as *Homo patiens*. The history of the language of medicine develops as a history of illnesses, because every historic epoch brought its contribution into medical language forming by presenting one predominant illness that is given the name representing its essence. Due to this the essence of the language of the medicine is revealed by its fundamental trait – terminology genesis that is characterized as 1) homogeneous, 2) geterochronic and 3) hereditary. First is funded by the word corpus of ancient Greek and Latin languages; second – by medical terms' appearance in different time periods and the third – by the linguistic source of knowledge represented in the terminology genesis. In this case terminology genesis represents itself as the chronicle of the medicine composed by generations of *medicus*. This chronicle unites different world's perceptions: human and medical, social and individual, temporary and connected with many epochs – and this is spiritual heredity enclosed in terms. The term has cultural and historic sources that take beginning in the invariant idea of the law of bounds that refers to the established world order, in which every thing has its place determined by the time factor. The term itself implements two functions: methodological (level of cognition) and socio-philosophical (level of world-view). Functioning on the level of medicine these two interrelated functions help to streamline medical knowledge and by that - to prevent distorting of the terms' meanings.

Key words: object, language of medicine, terminology genesis.

P. 116. *Rodin K. A.* FREE INDIRECT EFFECT OF THE CINEMA. Free indirect discourse (FID) or seemingly indirect style, one of the most problematic category in the contemporary science of language, is considered as the deep shape-generating source of the cinema emotional and dramatic impact. Because of that free indirect discourse as a linguistic category is interpreted as a free indirect *effect* concerning study of the film art. In the first place the article deals with three conception of FID which belong to M. Bakhtin, P. Pasolini and G. Deleuze, respectively. Much of the research output links with the problem of cultural self-reflectiveness in connection with FID (explained by an example of M. Bakhtin and P. Pasolini) as well as with illustrate how free indirect effect form an author individual style (explained by an example of L. von Trier).

Key words: free indirect discourse, free indirect effect, cinema.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

P. 124. *Abilkalamova A.B.* INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS IN THEOLOGICAL TREATISES OF SEVERINUS BOETHIUS. The work examines Boethius' interpretation of Christian dogmatics and its relation to Neoplatonic philosophy. The cause of attempt to write this article was a long-standing debate whether Boethius was Christian or not. Since the Middle Ages to our time this debate has been conducted as if the question of faith was principal to Boethius himself. Such an assumption does not accord with the idea of antique origins of Boethius' philosophical outlook. The antique philosophy never gave much significance to dogmatics: the interpretation of mythological symbolics served pure philosophical purposes. It was of importance for an antique philosopher not to adhere to an established opinion of God, but to comprehend the divine laws, to search for the highest good. Therefore it can be said that Boethius was Christian just as much as it accorded with his philosophy. The question is, does his philosophical interpretation of dogmatics accord with the foundations of Christian religion? In the treatise «On the Holy Trinity» («*Quomodo trinitas unus deus ac non tres dii*») Boethius uses the formal methods and conceptual apparatus of antique dialectics for solution of the trinitary problem. Such methods were used both by the first apologetics and by St. Augustine in his book «On the Trinity»; but if the apologetics used

philosophical tools for substantiation of the religious dogmatics, Boethius used the dogma as a means of constitution of philosophical concepts.

The work examines the linguistic aspect of Boethius' methodology used for solution of theological problems. This methodology is based on Aristotle's teaching reworked in the spirit of Neoplatonism. The "grammatical Platonism", which sets the rules of predication in theology, results in metaphysical Platonism, which defines the philosophical interpretation of Christian dogmatics. Among the linguistic conceptions constituting the treatise's conceptual matrix the central place is taken by an original theory of copula, according to which the verb «esse» takes grammatical meaning in existential sentences and lexical meaning in predicate sentences. Obviously, the linguistic theory of Boethius was influenced by the Neoplatonic idea of the identity of Being and unity. The structure of theological statement misses the subject, therefore the verb must take its function; accordingly, the author's conception of the meaning of copula expresses the sense that he puts in the concept of God. The theology that was explicitly expressed in «The Consolation of Philosophy» is implicitly present in the treatise on the linguistic level. The conceptualization of dogmatics serves Boethius as a means of assertion of his own philosophical positions.

Key words: *Boethius, theological treatises, univocal, multivocal, substantial predication.*

P. 131. *Berestov I.V. THE REGRESSUS AD INFINITUM IN ZENO'S OF ELEA ARGUMENTATION FOR THE SIMPLICITY OF 'WHAT IS'.* In the present paper we are presenting the interpretation of the one Zeno's of Elea arguments in favour of the position that a plurality of beings is impossible or unthinkable. This is the *a contrario* proof, in which the *regressus ad infinitum* is used. The proof is based on the logically exhaustive dilemma: elements of the initial plural being (or the whole) either have their own elements (i.e. they are divisible), or they have not ones (i.e. they are indivisible). If they have the elements, than the dilemma is repeated with respect to those last elements. Thus, either we have *regressus ad infinitum*– if we are attempting to think the being as plural or complex, – or we reach a element that is absolutely simple, but, nevertheless, is connected with other elements, so that to obtain the whole. In the first case Zeno affirms that it is impossible to think such a infinitely complex being. For to think it would mean to complete the last act in an infinite sequence of acts – i.e. in one which contains acts of the thought distinguishing of parts from the whole. The last claim seems to be as much unrealizable one as the claim to point out the last member of an infinite series. It is the claim that the *completion of an infinite sequence of discrete acts is impossible*, as G. Vlastos formulates this. We pay some attention to similarity of this argument to the argument from the *Dichotomy* (or the *Race Course*), which is the argument against possibility to think a locomotion. Also it is necessary to notice that Zeno is using here the principle «the whole is not identical with any of its parts». In the second case Zeno affirms that the being, which is connected with something, also is connected with the connection, by means of which it is connected with something. In other words, the being, if it possesses some property, also possesses ' *the possession this property* '. Hence, such a being isn't absolutely simple one (or isn't indivisible one). But this issue contradicts the selected alternative. *Eo ipso*, Zeno accepts here the assumption: any absolutely simple being can't be a part of something, can't belong to something, can't be connected with something, can't have any properties. In trying to illustrate this assumption, Zeno gives the example of the line and points, which are located on the line: those points – as simple objects, which have zero magnitudes, – cannot compose in the sum a non-zero magnitude line, even if they are infinite in number. This assumption is, in our view, can be seen as somehow obvious and intuitively acceptable one, unlike the assumptions used by some historians of philosophy to justify that multiple things cannot be composed of absolutely simple elements. For example, S. Makin suggest that Zeno have used the assumption: part inherits all the properties of the whole. So, if the whole is divided, then each its part is divided, and so on *ad infinitum*. Other assumption is the W.E. Abraham's one: all 'what is' has a magnitude and is divisible everywhere. We provide examples of the so-called "Zeno objects", which are discussed by many contemporary philosophers. The interest to those objects is generated by the paradoxes, which they are causing. Thus we show that at least some of Zeno's paradoxes are by now far from being resolved, despite the fact that this paradoxes are the subject of a huge number of publications (see the works of distinguished scholars, e.g. J. Benardete, P. Benacerraf, A. Grünbaum).

Key words: *Zeno of Elea; the one and the many; regressus ad infinitum; part and the whole; magnitude and continuum.*

P. 146. *Volf M.N. EPISTEMIC INQUIRY IN PLATO'S "MENO".* Leaving aside the traditional logical discussion, we examined "Meno" in relation to the key concept of this dialogue – inquiry (*zetesis*) of the knowledge, and of the role which the epistemic inquiry play for Plato's doctrine in general, for his theory of Forms and how to understand *anamnesis*. In this article we focused on Plato's

epistemic inquiry account, what elements it is composed, and we briefly reviewed the significance of the theory of definition, *elenchos* and aporia (paradox) in Plato as the elements of the philosophical inquiry. We didn't discuss the Meno's paradox in logical terms, but we did it as two possible alternatives for the inquiry: whether to seek what is already known (Z1) or seek that can't be known at all (Z2). In this article we argued that Socrates didn't imply and provide a logical solution of the paradox, but considered it as an element of inquiry and proved his choice in favor of Z2. We believed that it is possible to reconstruct two theses that led Socrates to their own final formulation of the paradox. These two theses allowed us to demonstrate that Meno's paradox applied not only to cases of absolute ignorance, but also to intelligible and quite explicit objects of the phenomenal world. First thesis: If we do not know something specific (*F*), how do we know how to accomplish this. The second thesis: It is impossible to get to learn what is the part of particular thing (*F*), not knowing what is that very thing. In inspecting of the second thesis we discussed the existential (inquiry of what-is, *ti*) and predicational (inquiry of predicates, things like *this*, *hopoion*) inquiry, associated with the Socratic decision of two different projects: "looking to" Forms and finding definitions. Further in article we argued that Socrates hadn't offer a logical solution of the Meno's paradox. Moreover Plato introduced the aporia in his dialogues like the element of the inquiry consists of the some components: *elenchos*, aporia, and *anamnesis*. Sharing the G. Vlastos's concept of *elenchos*, we drew attention to the fact that it was not a refutation in its pure form, but it should be understood as an argument or proof. So the feature of *elenchos* would be an inquiry through a series of questions from Socrates and of answers from the interlocutor. Often this kind of inquiry could result as aporia and thus is given the direction for a new inquiry. It is usually assumed that the aporia in Plato cannot be considered as part of a positive inquiry. In this article followed by V. Politis we distinguished cathartic and *zetetic* aporia. We believed that in addition to some of the cathartic function same of aporia has also *zetetic* functions, Meno's paradox relates to this type of aporia. In the case of Meno's paradox Socrates modeled the inquiry as unknown or partially known inquiry through his famous doctrine of recollection, we argued that it was one of the steps in Plato's epistemic inquiry. Of the two possible interpretations of *anamnesis* - rational or mythical - we choose the first, understanding *anamnesis* as a metaphor, as another Platonic myth, beyond which lies a practical experiment and learning. *Anamnesis* then was one more component of epistemic inquiry.

Key words: *epistemic inquiry; Plato; Meno's paradox; Socratic method.*

P. 160. *Krechetova M.Y.* THE DISCOVERY OF PUBLIC SPACE: V. FON HUMBOLDT. This article continues the theme of the formation of public space in Europe, XVIII century and its interpretation in the German intellectual tradition. The beginning of this research - in the article "To the distinction of private and public application of reason in I.Kant" (see "Journal of Tomsk State University. Philosophy. Sociology. Political Science" № 4 (12) 2010). This article analyzes the views of the German thinker V.fon Humboldt. The analysis is based on two works V.fon Humboldt, "On the internal and external organization of higher academic institutions in Berlin" and "On the limits of state activity." The article describes, first, public space as a purely "intellectual". The subject of special consideration here are the relationship of university and state. Also hypothesized about the special significance of "public opinion" as an arbiter of different mechanisms of selection of scientists: the appointment of university professors and state, the choice of its members academies and a free presentation of his ideas to the public lecturer. he article also examines the public space as a "social" one. Particular attention is paid to critique V.fon Humboldt harmful effects and errors of state activity. The article cataloged such effects: the spirit of uniformity, the weakening of the forces of the nation, weakening of social bonds, ignoring the minority and the individual, the mechanical nature of the activity. In the conclusion of the article compares the views of Kant and Humboldt V.fon: 1) Regarding the relation of "freedom of thought" and "freedom of action"; 2) Regarding the relationship between person and the state; 3) With regard to the ontological and ethical status of the "general will"; 4) On the question of the applicability of the values of "reasonableness" and "education" to the government, namely the activities of the monarch and public officials; 5) The function of "public opinion" and its definition as a reasonable opinion and educated people.

Key words: *freedom, public space, university, society, state.*

P. 171. *Malyshkin E. V.* THE CONDITIONS OF FEASIBILITY OF UNIVERSAL CHARACTERISTICS. In the paper I investigate leibniz's project of universal characteristic, as if this project was not only conceived, but also executed. I proceed from the assumption that the main features of this project are: 1. a special attention to the virtual being and daily treatment with it and 2. definition of knowledge as a distributed project, conducted by different people and/or groups independently. The presence of both signs today is obvious. If we trace the conditions that Leibniz

himself - either implicitly or explicitly - takes as necessary to carry out its project, it will allow us to observe, what is our involvement in that spheres, in which things tend to be described in the language of ones and zeros. This conditions are: 1) The fulfillment of primary account, that is rational interpretation of the concept of the creation. 2) Distinction between moral and metaphysical certainty. To demonstrate the essence of the second condition, the article dealt with Leibniz's objection to Descartes, who asserted that God is a deceiver, if we are deceived, even when we have clear and distinct ideas. Leibniz admits that we do not perceive reality, and our knowledge is nothing more than a useful fiction, not, however, without glimpses of reality. In this regard we consider Leibniz's phenomenology of knowledge. As soon as we assume the second condition, we must accept the first. This distinction between certainties is not given to us entirely, because we can not point out to the metaphysical certainty, we deal with it only in the statements of identity, which is problematical. But that distinction possible due to the fact that God have performed the initial account, which accompanies the creation of the world: the account of preferences in the selection of an optimal universe.

Key words: *universal characteristics, initial count, moral and metaphysical certainty.*

MONOLOGS, DIALOGS, DISCUSSION

P. 177. *Bessonov A.V.* TOWARD AN INTERPRETATION OF GÖDEL'S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS. The generally accepted universal restrictive interpretation of Gödel's celebrated incompleteness theorems is refuted. Counterexamples to the second theorem are given, and we argue for the boundedness of the expressive means used by Gödel. Within the frames of Gödel's approach, we prove a third incompleteness theorem according to which infinitely many judgments most common in arithmetic turn out to be undecidable. Thereby the conclusion on fundamental inadequacy of Gödel's knowledge representation is justified. Therefore, results obtained in that representation cannot be legally transferred to substantive knowledge.

Key words: Gödel's theorems, undecidability, unprovability predicate, third incompleteness theorem, knowledge representation.