Statistical data: 1 January 1997 - 30 April 1997

• Decisions by the plenary Court: 6
• Decisions by chambers: 40
• Number of other decisions by the plenary Court: 16
• Number of other decisions by chambers: 489
• Number of other procedural orders: 8
• Total number of decisions: 559

Important decisions

Identification: CZE-1997-1-001
a) Czech Republic / b) Constitutional Court / c) Third Chamber / d) 06.03.1997 / e) III.US 271/96 / f) Proper statement of reasons as necessary attribute of a just trial / g) / h).

Keywords of the systematic thesaurus:
Institutions - Courts - Decisions.
Fundamental Rights - Civil and political rights - Procedural safeguards - Fair trial.
Fundamental Rights - Civil and political rights - Procedural safeguards - Detention pending trial.

Keywords of the alphabetical index: Court findings / Statement of reasons in a court decision.

Headnotes:
In appellate decisions dismissing complaints against decisions not to release the complainant from custody, the statement of reasons must be concrete and clear to meet the requirement of a fair and just trial.

Summary:
1. The independence of decision making by ordinary courts is achieved within a framework of constitutional and statutory rules of material and procedural character. The procedural legal framework is represented first of all by the principles of proper and fair trial as set out in Articles 36 et seq. of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, as well as in Article 1 of the Constitution. These principles - as applied in criminal proceedings before court - prescribe for a well-balanced and argued statement of reasons in a manner specified inter alia by Section 134.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. The statement of reasons must show the relationship between the established facts and considerations when evaluating them, on the one side, and the legal findings of the court, on the other. If the statement of reasons does not contain concrete evidence but a mere reference to the content of the file - including in cases the court decision in question is not capable of reviewing due to unintelligibility and lack of evidence - the legal finding of the court represents a violation of the constitutional rule that prohibits arbitrariness in decision making and, thus, this decision must be held contrary to Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as well as to Article 1 of the Constitution.
3. By revocation of the decision of the Regional Court in Ostrava of 11 September 1996, File no. 4 to 370/96, the proceedings gave rise to the possibility of passing a decision on the discharge of the complainant from custody with effects ex tune. For these reasons other decisions of the Regional Court in Ostrava on confining the custody that followed after the decision complained of cannot succeed. Those decisions must be reviewed as a result of the new decision on the complaint against the decision of District Court in Vsetin of 21 August 1996 on release from custody. The review may only occur by quashing the two decisions of the Regional Court in Ostrava of 19 December 1996, File no. 4 to 480/96 and 4 to 523/96. For the above reasons the Constitutional Court quashed these decisions without dealing with the constitutionality of their content.

Languages: Czech.

Identification: CZE-1997-1 -002
a) Czech Republic / b) Constitutional Court / c) Plenary / d) 02.04.1997 / e) PLUS 25/96 / f) Five percent limit of votes as minimum required for obtaining mandates by parties in parliamentary election / g) Sbirka zakonu, 88/1997, 2018-2024 / h).

Keywords of the systematic thesaurus:
Constitutional Justice - Types of litigation - Electoral disputes - Parliamentary elections.
General Principles - Democracy.
General Principles - Proportionality.
Institutions - Legislative bodies - Composition.
Fundamental Rights - Civil and political rights - Equality - Scope of application - Elections.
Fundamental Rights - Civil and political rights -Electoral rights.

Keywords of the alphabetical index:
Restriction on minimum percentage of votes / Elections, threshold / Democracy, representative.

Headnotes:
The five percent threshold for political parties to be represented in the House of Representatives is in conformity with the Constitution due to the need of integrity and stability of the political scene.

Summary:
The Constitutional Court dismissed a proposal of the Democratic Union to repeal the provision of the electoral law according to which only a political party that receives at least 5 percent of votes in total may be represented in the House of Representatives.
In the stage of the election proceedings in which the distribution of mandates takes place, the integration principle conflicts with the principle of differentiation because the House of Representatives should by its composition allow for the representation of a political majority capable both of building a government and of exercising legislative power accorded to it by the Constitution.
The principle of representative democracy enables to integrate into the electoral mechanism some elements of stimulation when necessary - especially in cases where, by an uncontrollable proportional system, the splitting of votes among a large number of political parties, the substantial "overmultiplication" thereof and the endangering of the functioning of the electoral system and of the parties' ability to take action may occur.
After a negative experience with the splitting of parliamentary composition, European countries widely introduced - when applying the system of proportional representation - integrating stimuli, in particular a restriction rule, which usually took the form of the five percent minimum thereshold. There is a generally recognised right by the legislator to regulate the differentiation of votes for a successful representation in the proportional system and thereby treat political parties differently when necessary to ensure the integrating character of the elections in creation of the political will of the people, in the interest of the unity of the electoral system as well as to ensure the achievement of the legal and political aims pursued by parliamentary election.
The restriction rule may only be compromised for serious reasons, whereas the reason for increasing the limit of the restriction rule is given by the intensity of its importance. It must be noted that the increase in the limit for the restriction rule cannot be unlimited so that e.g. a ten percent rule may be held to be a regulation that constitutes a threat to the democratic essence of the proportional system. Therefore, one must consider whether the restriction of the equity of electoral rights represents the minimum measure necessary for providing the integration of political representation that enables for the composition of the legislative body to form a majority desirable for passing decisions and for the creation of a government that receives the confidence of the parliament. Thus, even for the restriction rule the principle of minimisation of state interference in relation to the aim pursued shall apply. Therefore the need for electoral restrictions must be interpreted narrowly.
From this point of view, the limits in place for the restrictive rule may not have any absolute value, but rather a relative one, which depends from the actual relation of political powers in a given country and from the structure of its differentiation.
A comparison with the majority electoral system will work in favour of the restriction clause. The majority electoral system is understood by constitutional courts uncondition-ally as a democratic one, although the political opinions of a large majority of voters are not represented in the parliament at all or at least in proportion to their strength. In fact, some sort of restriction rule follows from the very essence of the majority electoral system, a rule that goes much further than it is usually the case for the proportional system. The result of the majority electoral system is that only the votes for the winning candidate can count as a success factor: all others "fall through". In the final result of the elections, in the composition of the elected body this significant difference is only compensated somewhat by the diversification of the results in individual districts so that the disparity in one part of the district is balanced by the opposite disparity in other districts. The majority system preserves in that way the equity of votes as to the balance of numbers, but an individual vote's chance of succeeding is sharply differentiated. Votes for the successful candidate hold a hundred percent success share, whereas all other votes have a success share of zero.
It follows from the aforegoing that the five percent restriction rule may not be refused a priori as a restriction of aforegoing electoral rights contrary to the Constitution. As the principle of differentiation, in consideration of this question, conflicts with the principle of integration, one must examine whether in the case of the Czech Republic the five percent rule is the minimum necessary for the creation of a House of Representatives capable of action, taking decisions and fulfilling its legislative mission, as well as for establishing a majority which would provide the government with political support, and whether the amount of interference into the principle of proportionality is not too high and could represent a threat to the democratic character of the elections.

Languages: Czech.